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Abstract
We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person
(bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed
equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only
if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero sum game. In this case, the
mixed equilibrium is also globally asymptotically stable. Global con-
vergence to the set of perturbed equilibria is shown also for (rescaled)
partnership games, also known as potential games. Lastly, mixed equi-
libria of partnership games are shown to be always unstable under all
dynamics of this class.
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1 Introduction
There has been a long history of interest in the question as to whether it is possible to
learn to play Nash equilibria. The first and most enduring learning process, fictitious
play, provided initially optimistic results for zero sum and 2 × 2 games (see Fuden-
berg and Levine (1998) for a recent survey). However, it has also been known since
Shapley’s (1964) famous example that there are games with a unique mixed strategy
equilibrium which is unstable under fictitious play and other learning processes. The
question as to how typical is instability remains open, as there are few general re-
sults. This shortage of clear theoretical predictions has become increasingly relevant
as researchers have begun to try to fit a stochastic version of fictitious play and rein-
forcement learning to data from experiments, see for example, Cheung and Friedman
(1997), Erev and Roth (1998) and Camerer and Ho (1999).
This paper analyses the properties of the perturbed best response dynamics that
underlie models of stochastic or smooth fictitious play. We here produce definitive
results on when it is possible to learn mixed strategy equilibria in two person games
under such a learning process. Our results are partly positive, in that we provide
results on global convergence for two classes of games introduced by Hofbauer and
Sigmund (1998), rescaled zero sum games, and rescaled partnership games. Together
they include almost all 2 × 2 games and many of the games which have been sub-
ject to theoretical or experimental investigation in the recent literature on learning.
However, our results are also negative in that we show that the set of games with
mixed equilibria stable for all perturbed best response dynamics is exactly the set of
rescaled zero sum games. That is, mixed strategy equilibria in all other games are
unstable for at least one form of the dynamic. We go on to discuss what these results
imply for stochastic fictitious play and reinforcement learning.
Smooth or stochastic fictitious play is a learning process, first examined by Fuden-
berg and Kreps (1993), where players’ payoﬀs are perturbed in the spirit of Harsanyi’s
(1973a) purification argument. Using techniques from stochastic approximation the-
ory, Benaïm and Hirsch (1999) showed that the behaviour of stochastic fictitious
play could be predicted by analysis of the associated continuous time perturbed best
response dynamics. In a recent paper Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) examine these
perturbed best response dynamics in 3× 3 bimatrix games. They find that there are
many games for which mixed equilibria are locally stable for some member of this
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class of dynamics, despite the many previous negative results on the stability of mixed
equilibria under learning and evolution, particularly in asymmetric games. Indeed,
they carry out a Monte Carlo experiment which suggests that this set of games forms
a significant proportion of games that possess mixed equilibria.
The current paper diﬀers from that of Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) on a number
of levels. First, we extend the analysis of local stability to two-player games of ar-
bitrary size. Second, this paper also considers the global analysis of stability. Thus,
for example, we are able to show by the Lyapunov function method that stochastic
fictitious play must converge in partnership games, local analysis reveals that mixed
equilibria of partnership games are unstable, indicating convergence to a pure equilib-
rium. Third, whereas Ellison and Fudenberg derive the conditions for an equilibrium
to be stable for some form of perturbed best response dynamic, we derive a criterion
for stability under all perturbed best response dynamics. Indeed, as we will see, the
set of dynamics we consider is also somewhat larger. Thus, our criterion for stability
is in two ways more demanding than that of Ellison and Fudenberg.
The global approach is taken further in Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002). Lyapunov
functions, similar to those used here, are used to show global convergence of stochastic
fictitious play in a number of classes of symmetric evolutionary games including zero
sum games, potential games and games with an interior evolutionarily stable strategy.
Convergence is also proved for supermodular games. Thus, Hofbauer and Sandholm
(2002) extends the global approach to the analysis of stochastic fictitious play, while
this paper contains a blend of local and global analysis of deterministic dynamics. It
is only this combination of approaches that enables the “if and only if” result that is
found here.
This current paper analyses general two person games in strategic form. In 2× 2
games, as Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) point out, the behaviour of the perturbed best
response dynamics is clear and intuitive. Where the game is purely competitive and
there exists only an equilibrium in mixed strategies, this learning process converges to
the equilibrium. In other games, where there exist pure strategy equilibria, a mixed
strategy equilibrium (if one exists) is unstable, and (generically) play converges to
a pure equilibrium. For games with more than two strategies, a much wider range
of behaviour is possible. However, rescaled zero sum and rescaled partnership games
have suﬃcient structure that the simple behaviour found in 2×2 games is reproduced
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in games of arbitrary size. In particular, in rescaled zero sum games which are purely
competitive, there is global convergence to a unique (often mixed) equilibrium. And in
rescaled partnership games, games involving a strong element of coordination and/or
common interest, generically there is convergence to a pure equilibrium.
2 Best Response Learning Dynamics
We consider learning in the context of two-player normal-form games. The games
are asymmetric (in the evolutionary sense). That is, the players labelled 1 are drawn
from a diﬀerent “population” from the players labelled 2. For example, in the “Battle
of the Sexes” game, players are matched so that a female always plays against a male.
The first population choose from n strategies, the second population has m strategies
available. Payoﬀs are determined by two matrices, A, which is n ×m, for the first
population, and B, which ism×n, for the second population. Let aij denote a typical
element of A, and bji an element of B.
There are two principal reasons why one might be interested in (perturbed) best
response dynamics. The first is that they describe the learning dynamics within a
large population of agents who are randomly matched with opponents in continuous
time. A model of this type is set out in Ellison and Fudenberg (2000). Second, and
perhaps more importantly, we can apply best response dynamics to cases where each
“population” consists of only one player. An example of this are the experiments
reported in Erev and Roth (1998) where pairs of experimental subjects play the same
game repeatedly over a large number of periods. Of course, what Erev and Roth
argue is that the observed behaviour is best described by a stochastic learning model.
However, results from the theory of stochastic approximation show that the asymp-
totic behaviour of such stochastic processes is linked to the behaviour of associated
continuous time deterministic dynamics. In Section 6 of this paper, we discuss the
implications of our results on the perturbed best response dynamics for stochastic
fictitious play and reinforcement learning.
There are also two principal ways of constructing the perturbed best response
dynamics. The first, due originally to Fudenberg and Kreps (1993), is that the decision
maker payoﬀs’ are subject to random shocks. This idea is familiar from the theory
of random utility. The second, is that the agent faces a deterministic control cost of
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implementing a mixed strategy. For example, placing a probability of 1/n on each
possible strategy may be “easier” than using a mixed strategy that implies that one
or more strategies are played with a very low probability. See Mattson and Weibull
(2002) for a formal treatment of this idea.
Under fictitious play, agents’ beliefs about their opponents’ actions are based
on the past play of their opponents. Let x ∈ Sn, where Sn is the simplex {x =
(x1, ..., xn) ∈ IRn :
P
xi = 1, xi ≥ 0, for i = 1, ..., n}, be the vector of historic
frequencies of the actions of the first player. That is, if up to some time t player 1
chooses the first of two strategies 30% of the time, then at time t, x = (0.3, 0.7). As
discussed above, it is also possible to think of this as the average past play of a whole
population of player 1’s. Let y ∈ Sm be the vector of the historic frequencies of the
choices of the second player. We write the interior of the simplex, that is where all
strategies have positive representation, as intSn and its complement, the boundary
of the simplex as ∂Sn. We also make use of the tangent space of Sn, which we denote
IRn0 = {ξ ∈ IRn :
P
ξi = 0}
The best response dynamics in the asymmetric case are simply specified as
x˙ ∈ BR(y)− x, y˙ ∈ BR(x)− y (1)
where BR(y) is the set of all best responses of player 1 to y. Of course, BR(y) is
therefore typically not a function but a correspondence and so (1) does not repre-
sent a standard dynamical system, but a diﬀerential inclusion or a set—valued semi—
dynamical system on Sn×Sm. It is still possible to characterise its behaviour in several
circumstances as Gilboa and Matsui (1991), Matsui (1992) and Hofbauer (1995, 2000)
show. However, with small changes to our specification, we can obtain the smooth
perturbed best response dynamics. This approach was pioneered by Fudenberg and
Kreps (1993), Kaniovski and Young (1995), and Benaïm and Hirsch (1999).
Given fictitious play beliefs, if the first player were to adopt a strategy p ∈ Sn,
and the second q ∈ Sm, they would expect payoﬀs of p · Ay and q · Bx respectively.
Following Fudenberg and Levine (1999, p. 118 ﬀ), we suppose payoﬀs are perturbed
such that payoﬀs are in fact given by
π1(p, y) = p ·Ay + εv1(p), π2(x, q) = q ·Bx+ εv2(q), (2)
where ε > 0. Here the function v1 : intSn → IR is defined at least for completely
mixed strategies p ∈ intSn and has the following properties:
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1. v1 is strictly concave, more precisely its second derivative v001 is negative definite,
i.e., ξ · v001(p)ξ < 0 for all p ∈ intSn and all nonzero vectors ξ ∈ IRn0 .
2. The gradient of v1 becomes arbitrarily large near the boundary of the simplex,
i.e., limp→∂Sn |v01(p)| =∞.
One possible interpretation of the above conditions is that the player has a control
cost to implementing a mixed strategy with the cost becoming larger nearer the
boundary.1 For example, in the game of matching pennies, the strategy (1
2
, 1
2
) is
probably easier to adopt than the strategy ( 1
999
, 998
999
). In any case, these conditions
imply that for each fixed y ∈ Sm there is a unique p = p(y) ∈ intSn which maximizes
the perturbed payoﬀ π1(p, y) for player 1. We assume that v2 : intSm → IR possesses
the same properties so that for each x ∈ Sn there is a unique q = q(x) ∈ intSm
which maximizes π2(x, q). We can therefore replace the best reply correspondence
BR(x, y) with a ‘perturbed best reply function’ (p(y), q(x)). Typical examples of
perturbation functions that satisfy these conditions are v1(p) =
P
i log pi (as first
used in the logarithmic games of Harsanyi (1973b)) and v1(p) = −
P
i pi log pi.
Diﬀerentiating the perturbed payoﬀ functions (2) with respect to first and second
argument (which we will denote by ∂1 and ∂2) respectively, the first order conditions
for a maximum will be ∂1π1(p(y), y) = ∂2π2(x, q(x)) = 0 or
ξ ·Ay + εv01(p(y))ξ = 0 ∀ξ ∈ IRn0 and η ·Bx+ εv02(q(x))η = 0 ∀η ∈ IRm0 . (3)
This could be written formally as
p(y) = (v01)
−1(−Ay
ε
), q(x) = (v02)
−1(−Bx
ε
). (4)
This shows that the perturbed best reply functions p and q are smooth. However, an
explicit evaluation of p seems to be possible only in special cases, see (7) below.
The original formulation of stochastic fictitious play due to Fudenberg and Kreps
(1993), see also Fudenberg and Levine (1998, p. 105 ﬀ), involved a truly stochastic
perturbation of payoﬀs. For example, one can replace (2) with
π1(p, y) = p ·Ay + εp · ρ1, π2(x, q) = q ·Bx+ εq · ρ2, (5)
1See Mattson and Weibull (2002) for an alternative axiomatic approach to the control cost prob-
lem.
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where each ρi is a vector of i.i.d. random variables with a fixed distribution function
and a strictly positive and bounded density. Assume each player sees the realisation
of her own perturbation, then chooses an action to maximise the perturbed payoﬀ.
Then, the probability that she will choose action i will be
pi(y) = Pr[argmax
j
(Ay)j + ερ1j = i]. (6)
This defines a smooth function p(y) which approximates the best reply correspon-
dence.
The relation between these two ways to perturb payoﬀs and smoothen best replies
was clarified by Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002). They show that any perturbed
best response function derived from a stochastic model (5) can also be derived from
a deterministic optimisation problem of the form (2). For a well—known example,
consider the exponential or logit choice rule, given in current notation with β = ε−1
by
pi(y) =
expβ(Ay)iPn
j=1 expβ(Ay)j
. (7)
This rule can be derived from the deterministic optimisation procedure (2) by setting
v1(p) = −
P
pi log pi and from the stochastic model (5) if the disturbance is given
by the double exponential extreme value distribution. However, what Hofbauer and
Sandholm (2002) also establish is that the converse does not hold. That is, there are
perturbation functions (e.g. v1(p) =
P
i log pi for n ≥ 5) that satisfy the two conditions
above but for which there is no corresponding stochastic perturbation even if the i.i.d.
assumption is weakened. This implies that the best response functions derived from
the deterministic procedure form a wider class than those arriving from the stochastic
optimisation problem.
If we assume that within two large populations, there is a smooth adjustment
toward the (perturbed) best response, we can write down the two population dynamics
as
x˙ = p(y)− x, y˙ = q(x)− y. (8)
Equally, as discussed above, this system of diﬀerential equations can be used to predict
the stochastic learning of individual agents and the long run behaviour of evolution-
ary models for games with randomly perturbed payoﬀs, see Hofbauer and Sandholm
(2002).
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We emphasize that we will be able to analyze the dynamics (8) despite the fact
that the perturbed best reply functions p(y), q(x) are not explicitly known – except
in the prime example (7) – and study the stability properties of its equilibria for
which there is no explicit formula. The equilibria of (8) occur at each intersection of
the perturbed best response functions. In that sense, they are Nash equilibria of a
game with the perturbed payoﬀs (2). They are also “quantal response equilibria” in
the terminology of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). In analogy to Harsanyi’s (1973a)
purification theorem, for each regular Nash equilibrium (x∗, y∗) and for each small
ε > 0, there will be an associated perturbed equilibrium (xˆε, yˆε) and limε→0(xˆε, yˆε) =
(x∗, y∗).2
In the case of zero sum games, the perturbed equilibrium will be shown to be
unique (Theorem 3.2 below). In a two player zero sum game, either a player has a
unique equilibrium strategy or she is indiﬀerent between diﬀerent strategies each of
which guarantee her a payoﬀ which is equal to the value of the game. The addition
of noise will break this indiﬀerence. For example, if all strategies had the same value,
then the unique equilibrium point is simply the point that maximises the perturbation
function v. In the case of partnership games, multiple (perturbed) equilibria are
possible. The stable equilibria are the maxima of a suitably perturbed potential
function, see Theorem 3.3 below.
3 Results on Global Convergence
Note that the exact form of the functions p(y), q(x) and hence the dynamic depends on
the nature of the perturbation functions v1, v2. The fundamental question is therefore
what results can be obtained which are independent of the exact form of v. It is known
(see Benaïm and Hirsch (1999)) that for generic 2 × 2 games the global qualitative
behavior of (8) does not depend on the perturbation function v and is the same as
that of the best response dynamics (1). Using ideas of Hofbauer (2000) in a symmetric
setting, we extend this result to higher dimensions for two important classes of games,
games of conflict and games of coordination.3
2Both McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and Binmore and Samuelson (1999) provide a more de-
tailed analysis of the relationship between perturbed equilibria and Nash equilibria of the original
unperturbed game.
3More recently, convergence results for stochastic fictitious play were obtained also for a third
class of game, supermodular games, by Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002).
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Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998, p127-8) consider the following equivalence relation:
the bimatrix game (A0, B0) is linearly equivalent to (or a rescaling of) the bimatrix
game (A,B) if there exist constants cj, di and α > 0, β > 0 such that
a0ij = αaij + cj, b
0
ji = βbji + di. (9)
Then (A,B) is a rescaled zero sum game if there exists a rescaling such that B0 =
−(A0)T and a rescaled partnership game if B0 = (A0)T . Equilibrium points of games
are unchanged under rescaling. That is, if (x∗, y∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the game
(A,B), it is also of (A0, B0). The corresponding perturbed equilibrium may change,
however. To see this note that the first order condition (3), for example for the
first population, becomes αξ · Ay + εv01(x)ξ = 0. In this model of perturbed payoﬀs,
multiplying the payoﬀ matrix by a positive factor is equivalent to reducing the noise
parameter ε by an equivalent amount.
We start with the following simple characterization.
Lemma 3.1 (A,B) is a rescaled partnership or zero sum game if and only if
cξ ·Aη = η ·Bξ for all ξ ∈ IRn0 , η ∈ IRm0 (10)
for some c 6= 0, where c > 0 for a rescaled partnership game and c < 0 for a rescaled
zero sum game.
Proof: Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998, p128-9). QED
Note that in 2 × 2 games the condition (10) reduces to ca0 = b0 where a0 =
a11 + a22 − a12 − a21 and similarly b0 = b11 + b22 − b12 − b21. This will be satisfied
for some nonzero c provided neither a0 or b0 are zero. Or, in other words, almost all
2×2 games are either rescaled zero sum games or rescaled partnership games.4 Thus
the results we establish here include most existing results on 2× 2 games as special
cases.
For example, the class of rescaled zero sum games includes all 2 × 2 games with
unique mixed strategy equilibria, which have been of particular interest both to the-
orists, e.g. Fudenberg and Kreps (1993), and to experimentalists, e.g. Erev and Roth
4Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) make a similar observation, but using the terms “games of conflict”
and “games of coordination”.
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(1998). Benaïm and Hirsch (1999) show that the equilibria of such games are glob-
ally asymptotically stable under the perturbed best response dynamics. This is now
generalised to all rescaled zero sum games.
Theorem 3.2 For any two person rescaled zero-sum game, the perturbed best re-
sponse dynamic (8) has a unique rest point which is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof: Consider the functions
V1(x, y) = π1(p(y), y)− π1(x, y), V2(x, y) = h[π2(x, q(x))− π2(x, y)]
where h > 0 is defined as h = −1/c where c is the constant from (9) implied by the
fact that (A,B) is a rescaled zero sum game. These functions are nonnegative and
vanish together precisely at perturbed equilibria. Then define,
V (x, y) := V1(x, y) + V2(x, y)
= π1(p(y), y)− εv1(x) + hπ2(x, q(x))− hεv2(y) + ε(−x ·Ay + hy ·Bx).
V is a strictly convex function of (x, y) since π1(p(y), y) = maxz π1(z, y) is convex,
being the maximum of linear functions in y, −v1 is strictly convex in x and −v2 is
strictly convex in y, and the final term reduces to a linear function in x and y as the
game is rescaled zero-sum. Hence the function V will attain its minimum value 0 at
a unique point, which is the unique perturbed equilibrium of the rescaled zero sum
game. The definition of p(y) and q(x) implies
∂1π1(p(y), y) = 0, ∂2π2(x, q(x)) = 0, (11)
where ∂1 and ∂2 denote again the partial derivatives with respect to the first and
second variable (within IRn0 and IR
m
0 ). Hence
V˙1 = ∂1π1(p, y)p˙− ∂1π1(x, y)x˙+ ∂2π1(p, y)y˙ − ∂2π1(x, y)y˙
Because of (11) we can rewrite this as
V˙1 = (∂1π1(p, y)− ∂1π1(x, y))x˙+ (p− x) ·Ay˙ (12)
= ε(v01(p)− v01(x))(p− x) + (p− x) ·A(q − y).
In a similar way, together with the application of Lemma 3.1, one obtains
V˙2 = hε(v
0
2(q)− v02(y))(q − y) + h(q − y) ·B(p− x) (13)
= hε(v02(q)− v02(y))(q − y)− (p− x) ·A(q − y)
9
By the strict concavity of v1 and v2, V˙ = V˙1 + V˙2 ≤ 0 follows, with equality only if
p = x and q = y. Thus V is a strict Lyapunov function, and Lyapunov stability and
global attractivity of the unique perturbed equilibrium follows. QED
Partnership games are games of coordination and common interest. One obvious
group of games within this class are the games sometimes called games of pure co-
ordination which have positive entries on the diagonal and zero elsewhere. Another
prominent example is the so-called stag hunt game, with two diﬀerent pure equilibria,
one pareto dominant, the other risk dominant. Partnership games have the property
that the payoﬀ for player 1 is equal to the payoﬀ of player 2, or x ·Ay = y ·Bx.
Every local maximum (x∗, y∗) of the players’ payoﬀs x ·Ay is a Nash equilibrium,
but not conversely, and the strict Nash equilibria correspond to the strict local max-
ima. Thus if, under some learning rule, payoﬀs are always rising in the unperturbed
game, there will be convergence to the set of Nash equilibria. Analogously, we show
in the next result that under the perturbed best response dynamics a suitable per-
turbation of the players’ payoﬀ is always rising out of equilibrium and hence orbits
move toward the set of perturbed equilibria.
Theorem 3.3 For any rescaled partnership game, each orbit of the perturbed best
response dynamics (8) converges to the set of perturbed equilibria.
Proof: Consider the function
U(x, y) = x ·A0y + εv1(x) + βεv2(y), (14)
where (A0, (A0)T ) is a rescaling of (A,B), and where, without loss of generality, the
scaling factor α in (9) is set to one. β > 0 is the scaling factor for the second
population. The first order conditions for the critical points of U in Sn × Sm will be
∂1U(x, y) = ∂2U(x, y) = 0 or
ξ ·A0y + εv01(x)ξ = 0 ∀ξ ∈ IRn0 and η ·B0x+ βεv02(y)η = 0 ∀η ∈ IRm0 . (15)
Comparison with the first order conditions (3) reveals that perturbed equilibria, x =
p(y), y = q(x), form the critical points of the function U .
We have
U˙ = x˙ ·A0y + x ·A0y˙ + εv01(x)x˙+ βεv02(y)y˙. (16)
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Note that from (3), ξ · A0y = ξ · Ay = −εv01(p)ξ and x · A0η = βη · Bx = −βεv02(q)η
holds for all ξ ∈ IRn0 and η ∈ IRm0 , so that for ξ = x˙ and η = y˙
U˙ = ε (v01(x)− v01(p)) (p− x) + βε (v02(y)− v02(q)) (q − y). (17)
Again by the strict concavity of v1 and v2, U˙ ≥ 0 with equality only at x = p(y) and
y = q(x). Hence every ω—limit set consists of perturbed equilibria. QED
The result is that all orbits of the dynamical system converge to the set of per-
turbed equilibria for any value of ε. Additionally, for small enough ε > 0, convergence
will be to a perturbed strict equilibrium and never a perturbed mixed equilibrium,
provided we restrict our attention to generic games and generic initial conditions.
This is because mixed equilibria of rescaled partnership games will be saddle points
under the perturbed best response dynamics (see Theorem 4.5 below). Hence, while
they attract some part of the state space (their stable manifold), for generic initial
conditions the dynamics will diverge from any mixed equilibrium.
The restriction to generic games is to exclude games with continua of Nash equi-
libria, which are indeed non-generic in the strategic form. Of course, extensive form
games often give rise to strategic forms of the type we exclude. An example of this is
the “Ultimatum Minigame” analysed by Gale, Binmore and Samuelson (1995). This
is a rescaled partnership game with a continuum of Nash equilibria, which in the
unperturbed game, i.e. with ε = 0, are local maxima for the potential function U .
In games such as these a noisy learning model may have an attracting perturbed
equilibrium which is not close to a pure equilibrium.
It is a reasonable question to ask whether these results on global convergence of
the perturbed best response dynamics can be extended to games with more than two
players. It has long been recognised that zero sum games with three or more players
have a completely diﬀerent competitive structure than those with two players, for
example, the minimax theorem does not hold. A similar distinction seems to hold
for dynamics and Benaïm and Hirsch (1999) have already shown that the perturbed
best response dynamics cycle rather than converge in a 3-person matching pennies
game. In contrast, partnership games naturally generalise to n players. A convergence
result for multiplayer partnership/potential games is given in Hofbauer and Sandholm
(2002).
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4 A Converse Result
We now ask the question whether there are mixed equilibria of any other games
(besides rescaled zero sum games) which are stable under all perturbed best response
dynamics that can be constructed using the deterministic perturbation method. We
find that there are not. The first step is to construct the linearisation of the perturbed
best response dynamics.
Lemma 4.1 We can write dp(y)/dy as 1εQ1A where Q1 is a symmetric matrix pos-
itive definite with respect to IRn0 . That is, ξ · Q1ξ > 0 for any nonzero ξ ∈ IRn0 .
Furthermore, Q11 = 0 where 1 = (1, 1, ...1).
Proof: This result is essentially obtained from diﬀerentiating (3), with
Q1 = −(v001(p(y)))−1, (18)
which is positive definite since v001(p) is negative definite by assumption. See Hopkins
(1999) for more details.5 QED
Now, given Lemma 4.1 and the dynamics (8), the Jacobian taken at a perturbed
equilibrium (xˆ, yˆ) will be
J =
Ã
0 dp(y)
dy
dq(x)
dx
0
!
− I = 1
ε
Ã
Q1(xˆ) 0
0 Q2(yˆ)
!Ã
0 A
B 0
!
− I. (19)
where Q1 and Q2, from Lemma 4.1, are both symmetric and positive definite with
respect to IRn0 and IR
m
0 respectively. Note that since the vector field (p(y)−x, q(x)−y)
is in IRn0 × IRm0 for x ∈ Sn and y ∈ Sm, it is the properties of the linearisation on
this subspace that matter. IRn can be decomposed into two orthogonal subspaces
IRn0 and IR
n
1 = {x ∈ IRn : x = c1, c ∈ IR}. When we look at a linearisation around
an equilibrium of any dynamics on Sn × Sm, the stability of that equilibrium will be
determined by n− 1 eigenvalues which refer to IRn0 and the m− 1 eigenvalues which
refer to IRm0 , and not the two remaining eigenvalues which refer to IR
n
1 and to IR
m
1 .
We can write the linearisation (19) somewhat more compactly as J = 1εQ(xˆ, yˆ)H−
I, where Q is the matrix with Q1 and Q2 forming blocks on the diagonal and H is the
5The analysis in Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) shows that this result also follows from taking
the Legendre transform of the convex function −v1.
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matrix with A and B on the oﬀ-diagonal. It implies that if µ is an eigenvalue for QH,
then (19) has an eigenvalue µ/ε−1. The condition for stability as ε becomes small is
therefore that QH must not have an eigenvalue with positive real part. However, as
the matrix QH has a zero trace, the only way to satisfy the condition for stability is
to have all eigenvalues with real part zero. If this is the case, the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian QH/ε − I will all have real part negative. It is this stable case that must
be identified.
We do this by determining a condition for instability and show that only rescaled
zero sum games fail to satisfy it. In essence, because we consider the whole class of
perturbed dynamics, we have a free choice of the matrices Q1, Q2, the only restrictions
being that they are positive definite and symmetric. Therefore, for almost any mixed
equilibrium, we can choose Q1, Q2 such that it will be unstable.
Lemma 4.2 If there exists ξ ∈ IRn0 and η ∈ IRm0 such that
ξ ·Aη > 0 and η ·Bξ > 0, (20)
then there are symmetric matrices Q1, Q2, positive definite on Rn0 and R
m
0 respectively,
and Qi1 = 0 such that the product
QH =
Ã
Q1 0
0 Q2
!Ã
0 A
B 0
!
has at least one positive eigenvalue.
Proof: Let (ξ, η) be such that (20) holds. Write H(ξ, η) = (Aη, Bξ) = (x, y).
Then, ξ · x > 0 and η · y > 0. Because ξ · x > 0, we can find an orthonormal basis
of vectors {z0, ..., zn−1} with z0 = 1 = (1, 1, ..., 1) such that ξ = Pαizi, x = Pβizi
with αiβi > 0 for i = 1, ..., n − 1 (that is, as ξ · x > 0, the angle between x and ξ
is less than 90◦, and so it is possible to find a basis such that the two vectors are in
the same orthant). Then there exists a unique symmetric matrix Q1, positive definite
with respect to IRn0 with {z0, ..., zn−1} as its eigenvectors such that Q1zi = αi/βizi for
i = 1, ..., n− 1 and Q1z0 = 0. Consequently, Q1x = ξ. Similarly, let Q2y = η. Then
QH(ξ, η) = λ(ξ, η), where λ = 1 > 0. QED
Clearly there exists a counterpart to Lemma 4.2, that if η ·Bξ < 0 and ξ ·Aη < 0,
for some ξ, η, then we can find a Q such that QH has an eigenvalue with real part
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negative. Therefore, for QH to have all eigenvalues with real part zero, it must be
true that
(ξ ·Aη)(η ·Bξ) ≤ 0, for all ξ ∈ IRn0 , η ∈ IRm0 . (21)
Of course, this condition is satisfied if either A or B are zero matrices. But if we
assume that the bimatrix game (A,B) has an isolated mixed equilibrium, then this
trivial case is excluded, and it follows that the two bilinear forms are proportional,
and the game is rescaled zero sum. This is the essence of the following.
Theorem 4.3 Let (x∗, y∗) ∈ int(Sn × Sm) be an isolated interior equilibrium of the
bimatrix game (A,B). If for all strictly concave disturbance functions v1, v2 satisfying
the assumptions in Section 2 the perturbed equilibrium (xˆε, yˆε) is locally stable for the
perturbed best response dynamics (8) for arbitrarily small ε > 0 then the game (A,B)
is a rescaled zero sum game.
Proof: If (x∗, y∗) ∈ int(Sn×Sm) be an isolated interior equilibrium of the bimatrix
game (A,B), then it is a regular equilibrium and n = m. It was shown in (Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1998, Theorem 11.4.2, p135-6) that the condition (21) holds if and only
if the equilibrium (xˆ, yˆ) is a Nash—Pareto pair if and only if (A,B) is a rescaled zero
sum game. If it does not hold, by Lemma 4.2 there exist symmetric positive definite
matrices Q1, Q2 such that the matrixQH has a positive eigenvalue. Next, find strictly
concave functions v1, v2 such that Q1 = −(v001(x∗))−1 and Q2 = −(v002(y∗))−1 at the
equilibrium (x∗, y∗). Then, for small ε > 0, the linearisation of the perturbed best
response dynamics, equal to Q(xˆε, yˆε)H/ε− I by (19), will have a positive eigenvalue
too. QED
Now, the above theorem says that only equilibria of rescaled zero sum games can
be stable for all dynamics of the form (8). However, this leaves open the possibility
that for other games an isolated fully mixed equilibrium may be stable for some
specifications of the noise function v and not for others. While this is not possible for
2× 2 games, this happens indeed for an open set of n× n games if n ≥ 3, see Ellison
and Fudenberg (2000) for some explicit examples with n = 3.
We proceed with our examination of the linearisation of the perturbed best re-
sponse dynamics, with a result on the calculation of the eigenvalues of a matrix of
the form (19), see e.g. Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998, p.118).
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Lemma 4.4 The eigenvalues of any matrix of the form
H =
Ã
0 A
B 0
!
,
with blocks of zeros on the diagonal and A is n×m and B is m× n, are the square
roots of the eigenvalues of AB.
Proof: The eigenvalue equation is H(x, y) = λ(x, y). This equation can be
decomposed into Ay = λx and Bx = λy. Premultiplying the second equation by A,
the result is ABx = λAy or, substituting from the first equation, ABx = λ2x. That
is, if λ is an eigenvalue of H then λ2 is an eigenvalue of AB. If m 6= n, then the rank
of H is at most 2min(n,m), and it is the nonzero eigenvalues of H which are the
square roots of the nonzero eigenvalues of AB. QED
We have already established the global stability of the unique perturbed equilib-
rium in rescaled zero sum games. However, in some applications, it is not suﬃcient
that an equilibrium is stable, it is also required to be hyperbolic.6 Hence we note
the following, which extends a generic local result of Ellison and Fudenberg (2000,
Proposition 8) for 3× 3 zero sum games.
Theorem 4.5 Any Jacobian matrix of form (19) evaluated at (xˆ, yˆ), the unique per-
turbed equilibrium of a rescaled zero sum game under the dynamics (8), will have all
eigenvalues with real part negative.
Proof: By Lemma 4.4, the nonzero eigenvalues of Q(xˆ, yˆ)H will be square roots
of the eigenvalues of Q1AQ2B, assuming without loss of generality that n ≤ m. If
the game (A,B) is a rescaled zero sum game, then Q1AQ2B will have the same
eigenvalues with respect to eigenvectors in IRn0 as cQ1AQ2A
T with c < 0. The matrix
P = AQ2A
T is symmetric and positive semidefinite with respect to IRn0 . The product
of a symmetric positive definite matrix with a symmetric positive semidefinite matrix
has all eigenvalues real and nonnegative (see for example, Hines, 1980). Hence, the
eigenvalues of cQ1P are less than or equal to zero. The nonzero eigenvalues of the
matrixQH are therefore the purely imaginary square roots of the negative eigenvalues
6An example where this condition is required is Theorem 2 in Benveniste et al. (1990, pp107-8)
which deals with convergence of stochastic processes with a constant step size. This could be used
to analyse stochastic fictitious play when agents place greater weight on more recent experience.
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of Q1AQ2B. The eigenvalues of the linearisation (19) as a whole, will be equal to the
eigenvalues of Q(xˆε, yˆε)H/ε minus one and hence all have real part negative. QED
The next result complements Theorem 3.2 and shows that the mixed equilibria
of rescaled partnership games are always saddle points under the perturbed best
response dynamics.
Theorem 4.6 Let E be a isolated interior equilibrium of a rescaled partnership game.
Then the corresponding perturbed equilibrium is unstable for (8) for all admissible
disturbance functions v1, v2 and all small ε > 0.
Proof: As we are considering a rescaled partnership game, the symmetric matrix
P = AQ2A
T used in the proof to the previous theorem is now positive definite with
respect to IRn0 . Hence, cQ1P has n−1 positive eigenvalues, as now c > 0. The matrix
QH has therefore n−1 positive and n−1 negative eigenvalues, these being the square
roots of the positive eigenvalues of Q1AQ2B. The eigenvalues of the linearisation (19)
as a whole, will be equal to the eigenvalues of Q(xˆε, yˆε)H/ε minus one. Now, as the
mixed equilibrium (x∗, y∗) is in the interior of Sn×Sn, by Lemma 4.1 and property 1 of
the perturbation functions given in Section 2, limε→0Q1(xˆε) = Q1(x∗) will be positive
definite, and similarly for limε→0Q2(yˆε).7 Hence, for a small ε > 0, the absolute value
of the eigenvalues of QH/ε will be suﬃciently large such that QH/ε− I will have at
least one positive eigenvalue. QED
There is another criterion for stability established by Ellison and Fudenberg (2000)
for the 3 × 3 case. A game is symmetric if, in current notation, A = B. In generic
symmetric games, where both players have the same perturbation function, any mixed
equilibrium is unstable. The genericity assumption rules out one notable exception,
zero sum games, which may be symmetric, but as we have seen, do not have unstable
mixed equilibria.
Theorem 4.7 Let E be a isolated interior equilibrium of a generic symmetric game
with A = B. Then if the two disturbance functions v1, v2 are the same the correspond-
ing perturbed equilibrium is unstable for all perturbed dynamics (8) for suﬃciently
small ε > 0.
7Note that in contrast each limε→0Qi(xˆε) may be a zero matrix if (xˆε, yˆε) corresponds to a
pure Nash equilibrium. This means that the −I term in J would dominate and a perturbed strict
equilibrium, for example, would be stable.
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Proof: Since A = B and the two perturbation functions are the same, then
xˆ = yˆ and consequently, when evaluated at (xˆ, yˆ), Q1 = Q2. So, Q1AQ2B = (Q1A)2.
This implies that the eigenvalues of the matrix Q1AQ2B will be the square of the
eigenvalues of Q1A. Given that in turn the eigenvalues of QH are the square roots of
the eigenvalues of Q1AQ2B, then if λ is an eigenvalue of Q1A, then both λ and −λ
are eigenvalues of QH. Hence, QH generically will have at least one eigenvalue with
positive real part.8 Hence, for a small ε > 0, the absolute value of the eigenvalues
of QH/ε will be suﬃciently large such that QH/ε− I will have at least one positive
eigenvalue. QED
What can we say about mixed Nash equilibria with less than full support, that
is, where players only place a positive probability on some of their strategies? The
analysis of this case turns out to be surprisingly diﬃcult. Suppose that there is a
symmetric 3×3 game with a mixed equilibrium (x∗, y∗) that only involves 2 strategies.
In the neighbourhood of the Nash equilibrium, as ε becomes small, we would expect
p(y) to approach x∗ which places positive weight on only two strategies. So, the
perturbed best response dynamics for the 3× 3 game seems to become “close” to the
dynamics for the 2 × 2 game for which (x∗, y∗) is a fully mixed equilibrium and we
would expect the equilibrium to have the same stability properties under both. The
problem is we have to consider the behaviour of Q1(xˆε)/ε as ε approaches zero. This
may explode rather than converge.
Thus, in order to be able to analyse the local stability of such equilibria we would
need the following properties of the behaviour of the matrix functions Q1, Q2 on the
boundary of the simplex to hold. Let (A,B)|K1×K2 be the smaller game where only
strategies from the sets K1 and K2 are available to player 1 and 2 respectively. A
Nash equilibrium E = (x∗, y∗) is regular if it is isolated and x∗ · Ay∗ > (Ay∗)i for
i /∈ K1 and y∗ ·Bx∗ > (Bx∗)j for j /∈ K2.
Assumption A Let E = (x∗, y∗) be a regular Nash equilibrium of (A,B) with
support (K1,K2) and (xˆε, yˆε) be corresponding perturbed equilibria for small ε > 0.
Then, first, we assume that the limits limε→0Q1(xˆε) and limε→0Q2(yˆε) exist and are
8The principal exception is when A = B = −AT , that is the game is zero sum. In that case, the
eigenvalues of Q1A will be entirely imaginary. This is not generic, as for some small perturbation of
A, Q1A will have some eigenvalue with non-zero real part.
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finite and second, if i /∈ K1, that is limε→0 xˆε,i = 0, then
lim
ε→0
1
ε
Q1,ij(xˆε) = 0 for all j. (22)
and a similar property holds for Q2.
In eﬀect what is required is that as ε approaches zero, the linearisation of the
perturbed best response dynamics approach that we would obtain from examining
the same dynamics on the smaller game (A,B)|K1×K2 . This seems reasonable, but
(22) will only hold if each Q1,ij approaches zero at a suﬃciently fast rate, a technical
property which is very diﬃcult to establish for the general case. Thus, while we
imagine that this assumption is met by most perturbation functions satisfying the
assumptions of Section 2, we only demonstrate that this is the case for the exponential
choice rule (7).
Lemma 4.8 If v1(p) = −
P
pi log pi and v2(q) = −
P
qi log qi then Assumption A is
satisfied.
Proof: First, if v1(p) = −
P
pi log pi then
Q1,ii = pi(1− pi), Q1,ij = −pipj (23)
so that clearly the first part of Assumption A is satisfied. Second, let E = (x∗, y∗)
be a regular equilibrium. Let P (p) = pi
Qn
j=1 p
−x∗j
j ≥ pi for some i /∈ K1. Then, given
the particular functional form (7), we have pi/pj = exp((Ay)i − (Ay)j)/ε), for all j.
And we can write
P (p) =
nY
j=1
Ã
pi
pj
!x∗j
= exp
µ
−1
ε
(x∗ ·Ay − (Ay)i)
¶
.
Note that from the regularity of the equilibrium E, there is some neighbourhood Y
of y∗, where x∗ · Ay − (Ay)i > c > 0 for all y ∈ Y . So, pi(yˆε)/ε ≤ P (p(yˆε))/ε ≤
(1/ε) exp(−c/ε), which approaches zero as ε goes to zero. Finally, together with (23)
this shows that the second part of Assumption A holds. QED
Of course, if (A,B) is a rescaled partnership game, then (A,B)|K1×K2 is also.
It is relatively easy to establish that partially mixed equilibria of symmetric games
and rescaled partnership games are also saddlepoints and hence unstable under the
exponential version of the perturbed best response dynamics.
18
Theorem 4.9 Let (x∗, y∗) /∈ int(Sn×Sm) be a regular mixed equilibrium with support
(K1,K2) of either a rescaled partnership game or a generic symmetric game (A = B).
If the perturbation functions are v1(p) = −
P
pi log pi and v2(q) = −
P
qi log qi, the
perturbed equilibrium (xˆε, yˆε) is unstable for the perturbed best response dynamics (8)
for suﬃciently small ε > 0.
Proof: Since (x∗, y∗) is a regular mixed equilibrium, K1 and K2 have the same
number of elements, and this number must be at least two. Consider the perturbed
best response dynamics for the game (A,B)|K1×K2 on SK1 × SK2. The linearisation,
which we write QKHK/ε − I, at a fully mixed equilibrium will have at least one
positive eigenvalue if the game is a rescaled partnership game (Theorem 4.6) or if
it is symmetric (Theorem 4.7). Now, returning to the dynamics on Sn × Sm, under
Assumption A, limε→0Q(xˆε, yˆε)H will have a mixture of zero eigenvalues and eigen-
values of QKHK and therefore at least one positive eigenvalue. Thus, for ε suﬃciently
small, Q(xˆε, yˆε)H/ε− I will have one too. QED
5 Deterministic versus Stochastic Perturbations
The purpose of this section is to clarify our results. We were able to show in the
previous section that, for any mixed equilibrium of a game that is not rescaled zero
sum, there is at least one form of the perturbed best response dynamics under which
it is unstable. However, as we saw in Section 2, there are two ways of constructing
perturbed best response functions. The proof of our result relies upon the wider set
of perturbed best response functions that arise from the deterministic method. How
diﬀerent would our results be if we could only employ functions constructed from
stochastic perturbations?
Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002, Proposition 2.2) point out perturbed best response
functions constructed using the deterministic method form a larger class. This is
because there are functions in that class that fail to satisfy the following condition
which does hold for all functions constructed by the stochastic method:
(−1)k ∂
kCi0(u)
∂ui1 ....∂uik
> 0 (24)
for each k = 1, ..., n − 1 and each set of k + 1 distinct indices {i0, i1, ...ik}, where
p(y) = C(Ay). The linearisation (19) only involves first order partial derivatives and
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so the only implication of the condition (24) for the linearisation is that Q1,ij < 0
must hold for i 6= j, and similarly for Q2. That is, the oﬀ-diagonal elements of
the matrices Q1, Q2 in the stochastic model must be negative. In the deterministic
model the requirement is only that Q1, Q2 are positive definite with respect to IRn0
and symmetric, with no restriction on the sign of the oﬀ-diagonal elements.
What was essential in establishing our result and in particular Lemma 4.2 was the
free choice of Q1 and Q2 from the entire set of positive definite symmetric matrices. If
we considered only the perturbed best response dynamics constructed from stochastic
perturbations, the set of possible positive definite matrices available to play with is
strictly smaller. It is therefore a logical possibility that, for some game (A,B), Lemma
4.2 fails to hold if we restrict our attention to matrices with negative oﬀ-diagonals.
On the other hand, the set of available matrices is still very large. It is our conjecture
that Lemma 4.2 still holds, though we have not been able to establish a proof. At
least, we have been unable to identify a game, which is not rescaled zero sum, that
has a mixed equilibrium which is stable for all stochastic perturbations.
6 Relation to Other Results
Perturbed best response dynamics are not the only model of learning in games. One
reasonable question therefore is whether the results we have produced here apply
to other forms of learning. If they do not then we would be much less confident
about whether our current results can predict actual behaviour in experimental games.
Luckily, as we will see, our current results are broadly in line with those obtained for
other learning models.
The model most closely linked to the perturbed best response dynamics is stochas-
tic fictitious play. Imagine two agents, who play the same game repeatedly at discrete
time intervals. Classical fictitious play is based on the principle that each individual
plays a best response to the past play of her opponent. Stochastic fictitious play
modifies the original model slightly by assuming a random choice of action in each
period, with the probabilities given by the perturbed best response functions p(y) and
q(x). In particular, one can think of players’ payoﬀs being subject to stochastic form
of perturbation, as outlined in Section 2. Further details of this model can be found
in Fudenberg and Levine (1998, Chapter 4), Benaïm and Hirsch (1999), and Hofbauer
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and Sandholm (2002). However, it should be apparent that the expected motion of
the above stochastic process is a discrete time form of the perturbed best response
dynamics (8). Or, in the terminology of stochastic approximation, the perturbed
best response dynamics represent the mean value ODE associated with stochastic
fictitious play. This means that stochastic fictitious play and the perturbed best re-
sponse dynamics will have (essentially) the same asymptotic behaviour. This link is
particularly strong when the diﬀerential equation is shown to be globally convergent.
Thus, the global stability results in Section 3 can also be applied to study the long
run behavior of evolutionary models for games with randomly perturbed payoﬀs, as
demonstrated in Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002). Moreover, the results, Theorem
4.6 and Theorem 4.9, that mixed strategy equilibria of rescaled partnership games
are unstable can be used in the analysis of stochastic fictitious play. See Duﬀy and
Hopkins (2001) for an example of this approach.
The main rival to stochastic fictitious play as a model of human learning has
been reinforcement or stimulus response learning, see Erev and Roth (1998). There
is still much debate over which of the two best describe human learning behaviour.
It has been known for some time that the expected motion of the Erev-Roth model
of reinforcement learning is related to the evolutionary replicator dynamics.9 These
dynamics in the asymmetric case can be written
x˙ = R(x)Ay, y˙ = R(y)Bx (25)
where R(x) is the matrix function with xi(1− xi) on the diagonal and −xixj on the
oﬀ-diagonal. It is therefore also a symmetric matrix positive definite with respect to
IRn0 .
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998, Ch 11) show that in rescaled partnership games the
replicator dynamics converge. This can be used to show that reinforcement learning
converges also. A result of this type can be found in Duﬀy and Hopkins (2001)
combined with an experimental test of its predictions. The linearisation of (25) at a
mixed equilibrium (x∗, y∗) can be calculated asÃ
R(x∗) 0
0 R(y∗)
!Ã
0 A
B 0
!
. (26)
There is an obvious similarity with the linearisation of the perturbed best response
dynamics (19). The similarity is even greater in the case of exponential perturbed
9The actual details are quite complicated and are analysed in Hopkins (2001), which also has
several results on the relationship between reinforcement learning and stochastic fictitious play.
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best response function (7), as then Q is actually identical to R. This, together with
Theorem 4.6, implies that the mixed strategy equilibrium of any rescaled partnership
game will be unstable under the replicator dynamics. This result can be used to show
that reinforcement learning will not converge to mixed strategy equilibria in rescaled
partnership games (again see Duﬀy and Hopkins, 2001).
The case of rescaled zero sum games is more complicated. The absence from (26)
of the additional −I term present in (19) implies that, for example, at an interior
equilibrium of a rescaled zero sum game, the linearisation will have all eigenvalues
with zero real part. Indeed, Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998, Theorem 11.2.5) show that
such equilibria are only neutrally stable under the replicator dynamics. Hofbauer
(1996) shows that while there is an open set of 3×3 games for which mixed equilibria
have all eigenvalues purely imaginary, at least two further conditions on the higher
order terms are needed for Lyapunov stability. On the other hand, the family of
rescaled zero sum games has codimension 3 in the set of all 3× 3 games (that is, in
eﬀect, they are non-generic). Hofbauer (1996) conjectures that an isolated interior
equilibrium can be Lyapunov stable for the replicator dynamics only for rescaled zero
sum games. Recently, Beggs (2001) has shown that despite the neutral stability of
mixed equilibria under the replicator dynamics, reinforcement learning does converge
in zero sum games.
Fictitious play is obviously linked to the best response dynamics. See Hofbauer
(1995, 2000) for some general results on this connection. It has been known for some
time that fictitious play converges in zero sum games. More recently, Monderer and
Shapley (1996) proved that fictitious play converges also in partnership games which
they call games of identical interest. Krishna and Sjöström (1998) show, for games
with certain cyclic structure, that mixed equilibria are generically unstable under
(continuous time) fictitious play. More recently, Echenique and Edlin (2002) prove a
very general result on the instability of mixed strategy equilibria under fictitious play-
like learning processes in games with strategic complements. In contrast, Sandholm
(2003) shows that if one allows a suﬃciently broad set of permissable perturbations,
any mixed strategy equilibrium can be stable under the resulting perturbed dynamic.
Hofbauer (1995) conjectures that if a mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable for
fictitious play or the best response dynamics (1), then the game is a rescaled zero
sum game. Our Theorem 4.3 is obviously related to these two conjectures.
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7 Conclusions
We have examined the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in general two player
games under the perturbed best response dynamics linked to smooth or stochastic
fictitious play. We found that such mixed strategy equilibria are stable for all dy-
namics of this class if and only if the game is a rescaled zero sum game. In that case,
the equilibrium is globally stable. We also show that in rescaled partnership games,
mixed strategy equilibria are unstable for the whole class of perturbed dynamics.
The result that mixed strategy equilibria are stable only in games that are linearly
equivalent to zero sum games seems strong. However, the claim is that it is only in
these rescaled zero sum games that there can be mixed equilibria that are stable
under all perturbed best response dynamics. There will be other games that possess
mixed equilibria that are stable for some dynamics in this class. Indeed, as Ellison
and Fudenberg (2000) find, these may constitute a significant proportion of the total.
However, for each of these we can find at least one perturbed best response dynamic
for which it would be unstable.
It is a somewhat subjective question as to what is the more important criterion,
“stable for some” or “stable for all”. It is complicated further by the fact that “all”,
that is the set of admissible perturbed dynamics, has two possible definitions. As
recently discovered by Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), the set of perturbed best
response dynamics constructed by the deterministic control cost method is strictly
larger than that arising from the stochastic perturbation of payoﬀs. Thus, our demon-
stration that all mixed equilibria, excluding those of rescaled zero sum games, are
unstable under at least one form of these dynamics, is a claim that they fail a very
strict test. The argument in favour of the approach we take here is that it allows rel-
atively sharp results. Furthermore, given there is some uncertainty about how people
learn, there must be even greater uncertainty about what form of payoﬀ perturbation
is appropriate.10 Consequently, results that do not depend on the exact form of the
perturbation function are particularly valuable.
Furthermore, the diﬀerences between the stochastic and the deterministic meth-
ods are diﬃcult to pin down. First, the two models coincide in a wide number of
10Empirical studies that have tried to fit learning models to experimental data have found that
individual behaviour is highly heterogeneous, for example, Cheung and Friedman (1997).
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cases. The considerable success of the quantal response equilibrium literature, start-
ing with McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), in explaining significant deviations of observed
play from Nash equilibrium has largely used the logit choice rule, which is consistent
with both the deterministic and stochastic models. Second, the set of cases for which
the two models diﬀer is very diﬃcult to characterize. For example, it is a logical
possibility that there is a class of games, that are not rescaled zero sum, which have
mixed strategy equilibria that are stable under all perturbed best response dynam-
ics consistent with stochastic perturbations. Given our present results, these mixed
equilibria could not be stable for all dynamics consistent with deterministic pertur-
bations and therefore for these games the two models give a substantially diﬀerent
prediction. However, not only do we not have a characterization of this set, we do
not have a single example of such a game,11 or any known case where the two models
oﬀer diﬀerent predictions.
In conclusion, rescaled zero sum games and rescaled partnership games are games
with a very strong structure and hence their stability properties under learning are
largely independent of the learning process used. What is perhaps more unexpected
is that in games without the strong structure of pure competition present in rescaled
zero sum games, it is always possible to find a reasonable learning process that will
diverge from any mixed strategy equilibrium.
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